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The Political Economy of A Trade-First Approach to Regionalism 
 
Graham Bird and Ramkishen S. Rajan 
 
Regional integration has become commonplace in the world economy. Moreover, there is 
clear evidence of a ‘trade first’ approach to regionalism. What is the logic behind this 
approach? Is it that trade integration prepares the ground for monetary integration by 
helping to fulfil optimum currency area criteria? Having analysed the economic inter-
relationship between regional trade integration and monetary union, the paper contends that 
the ‘trade first’ strategy can instead be explained in political economy terms; there is a 
higher political return to trade integration. The paper concludes by examining the 
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 1.  Introduction 
There have been waves of regionalism in the world economy.  The first was 
during the 1960s with Western Europe taking the lead.  At this time the US 
opted for multilateralism rather regionalism.  However, the second coming 
during the 1980s and beyond included the US.  This wave has yet to end with 
an increasing number of regional agreements covering virtually all regions of 
the world including, most recently a number of Asian countries. 
Regionalism has various components.  These encompass both trade and 
monetary integration.  Each component tends to involve a gradation running from 
‘modest’ to full integration.  On the trade side the gradation runs from preferential 
trade areas to common markets.  On the monetary side the gradation runs from 
exchange rate coordination (including regional basket pegs or a regionally-harmonized 
exchange rate band) to full monetary and fiscal integration incorporating a single 
currency, common monetary policy and institutions, and coordinated tax and fiscal 
policy.  However, not only are the components of regionalism graduated, regionalism 
itself is usually phased in terms of the sequence in which the components are 
introduced.  Historically, regionalism has tended to begin with the establishment of a 
regional trade agreement (RTA).  Monetary integration usually occurs subsequently, 
with the final stage, in principle, being full economic and monetary union. 
Since empirical observation suggests that countries do not move from zero to 
full regionalism at one stroke, but instead stage the process, usually over many years, 
a question arises as to the appropriate sequencing in which the stages occur.  What is 
the logic behind a ‘trade-first’ approach to regionalism?  Surprisingly this is not a 
question that has been widely asked or discussed in the literature on regionalism.  
Instead, this has tended to focus on analysing the individual components of the 
process in isolation.  However, the sequencing of measures of regional integration is 
the central focus of this paper.  To answer the question, we examine the interactions  
 
between trade and monetary integration.  Is the connection one way or two way?  In 
the former case a specific sequence would be suggested.  In the latter, sequencing may 
become more complex. 
  The layout of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief empirical 
summary of the extent of regionalism worldwide.  This provides indicative evidence 
for the claim that trading arrangements are much more common and occur at an earlier 
stage in the process of regionalism.  Section 3 summarizes the principal issues that 
have emerged from the literature on trade and monetary integration and briefly 
examines some of the evidence on their quantitative importance.  Section 4 isolates 
the areas of interaction between the trade and monetary components of regionalism to 
discover whether there is compelling economic logic for a ‘trade first’ strategy 
towards integration.  Section 5 suggests that, in the absence of compelling economic 
logic, the preferred sequence reflects the importance of political economy factors.  On 
the basis of this analysis, the final section briefly examines the extent to which 
existing regional trade agreements will graduate towards full monetary and economic 
integration over the reasonably near term. 
 
2.  The Extent and Pattern of Regionalism 
  Members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are bound to notify it of 
any FTA they establish or participate in.  Notifications could also refer to the 
accession of new parties to an agreement that already exists.  Table 1 provides a 
summary listing of the Regional Trade Agreements that have been notified to the 
WTO and also shows their membership.  There are well over 170 FTAs in force, with 
intra-RTA trade accounting for almost half of overall global trade.  Note though that 
not all the FTAs notified to the WTO are still in force today, while recent ones that 
have just been negotiated are not included (Crawford and Laird, 2001).   
  A number of things emerge from the Table.  First, although most attention has 
been paid to integration in Europe, the Table reveals just how wide-ranging RTAs are.  
They cover most parts of the world.  Second, the Table shows that trade integration is  
 
indeed largely a regional phenomenon involving geographically proximate countries.  
This could reflect the economic proclivity to trade with regional neighbours, and is 
consistent with gravity trade models which stress the significance of transport costs in 
discriminating against more distant trade partners (Frankel, 1997).  The finding is also 
consistent with the suggestion that ‘subjective resistance’ (Drysdale and Garnaut, 
1989) or ‘psychic distance’ (Linnemann, 1966), including perceptions of risk, 
imperfect information and cultural and language barriers, tend to be directly related to 
physical distance between countries.  The strong regional orientation or ‘territoriality’ 
of trade agreements also seems to imply that it is the politics of the region that is 
paramount (Pollins, 1989).  RTAs may be viewed as a means of enhancing regional 
security and political stability.  Third, the Table confirms the preponderance of trading 
over monetary agreements.  Indeed of those listed it is only the European 
Communities and the West African Economic and Monetary Union that have a 
significant monetary dimension.   
  In the case of Europe the pattern emerged where an initial trade agreement was 
followed by increasingly binding constraints on exchange rate policy.  First, in terms 
of the ‘snake in the tunnel’ and then the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European 
Monetary System and eventual monetary integration with the adoption of a single 
currency, the euro, in 1999.  In the case of Africa the seven members of the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union along with the six members of the Central 
African Economic and Monetary Union and the Comoros comprised the CFA Franc 
Zone and reflected the close former colonial ties of the member countries to France.  
Here exchange rate pegging and monetary coordination coincided with trade 
liberalization.  The importance of colonial links is another important determinant of 
trade as highlighted by the gravity model (Frankel, 1997).  In many other regional 
settings, most notably in Asia, there is rather loose discussion of the possibility of 
moving beyond trade integration towards fuller economic and monetary union along 
the lines of the European model but at present the discussions have led to little 
tangible forward movement (Bird and Rajan, 2002). 
  The evidence therefore confirms the existence of a trade-first approach to 
regional integration.  Countries begin the process of integration by establishing RTAs.  
Monetary integration is at present rare.  Drawing in particular on the example of 
Europe, monetary integration comes along, if at all, some considerable time after trade 
integration.  How can this pattern be explained?  Why has trade integration proved 
more attractive than monetary integration?  Is there an economic explanation using 
conventional theory (Balassa, 1961), and is this reasoning still valid in the current 
global environment where cross-border capital and currency flows are as significant as 
real sector transactions and where capital account crises have been the norm rather 
than the exception (Bird and Rajan, 2002)?  
 
 
3.  The Gains from Trade and Monetary Regionalism: Economics or 
Politics? 
 
There is a large literature examining the gains from regional trade 
liberalization and monetary integration and we make no attempt to review it.   
However, without getting involved in detail, a number of general points emerge from 
the literature. 
  Conventional static analysis of the gains from the formation of RTAs suggests 
that, in principle, they are likely to be small.  Putting trade diversion to one side for a 
moment, the gains depend largely on the extent to which there is trade creation, such 
that the welfare gains will equal one half of the trade creation multiplied by the 
percentage reduction in tariffs.  For example, if trade is initially equal to about 20 
percent of GNP and the RTA liberalizes about 50 percent of trade, which increases by 
50 percent as a consequence of a tariff cut of 10 percent, it follows that the welfare 
gain will be equivalent to about a quarter of one percent of GNP.  Trade diversion will 
then reduce this overall gain.  Calculations of this type suggest that RTAs are unlikely 
to be justified by large static gains.  But there may be dynamic gains from trade 
consequent upon additional competition and reduced x-inefficiency, economies of 
scale, research and development and external economies (Grossman and Helpman, 
1991).  However, these dynamic gains are more difficult to pin down quantitatively 
and unsurprisingly, therefore, there remains some debate over their empirical 
importance.   
  General agreement that the static gains are small and that the dynamic gains 
are uncertain have led many observers to conclude that RTAs are better explained in  
 
terms of politics rather than economics (Haggard, 1995 and Ortiz Mena, 2000).
1  
Indeed, Schiff et al. (2000) have cautioned that regionalism “is good politics partly 
because it is ‘soundbite economics’ based on only those effects that are easiest to 
grasp…Regional integration may also be good economics, but the impetus for 
integration has usually not been the economics. Sometimes, good politics delivers bad 
economics” (p.11).  As noted, RTAs could also serve a diplomatic/security purpose 
(Schiff and Winters, 1998).  
Much the same goes for monetary integration.
2  Here, traditional arguments 
that regional exchange rate coordination or stability encourages trade by eliminating 
exchange rate uncertainty
3 are matched by counter-arguments that additional certainty 
                                                 
1 It is, nonetheless, important to keep in mind that RTAs nowadays are ‘deep and 
multifaceted’, also encompassing services trade and issues relating to investment (principles 
of national treatment and the right of establishment), government procurement, e-commerce, 
customs procedures, promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises and much more.  This 
being the case, such regional agreements could act as a “testing ground or pilot project for 
exploring complex trade issues” and may help establish some sort of precedent or benchmark 
for trade negotiations involving a larger number of countries, including one at the multilateral 
level (Sager, 1997, p.242).  In addition, from an individual country perspective, there may be 
an economic rationale for a country to source a number of trade pacts as it could gain a first-
mover advantage by being a ‘hub’ of a number of overlapping arrangements (Wonnacott and 
Lutz, 1989 and Wonnacott (1996).  The benefits of being a hub could arise from investment 
diversion as well as via cost advantages vis-à-vis producers in the ‘spokes’, as hub producers 
are able to obtain more of their intermediate goods at relatively lower prices.  Rajan et al. 
(2001) and Rajan and Sen (2002) discuss a number of these issues in the context of 
Singapore’s recent trade policies. 
2 As noted earlier, monetary integration may involve no more than exchange rate 
coordination but may also extend to coordinated monetary policy, common monetary 
institutions and ultimately a single currency.   In this paper, we use the term somewhat 
loosely but endeavour to emphasize when it is the exchange rate dimension that is significant 
by then referring to exchange-rate unions.  Kenen (1997) distinguishes between a ‘currency 
area’ which he defines  as “ a group of countries that undertake to contain their bilateral 
exchange rates within narrow bands defined in respect of agreed central rates which they can 
change unilaterally” and a ‘monetary union’ in which, according to him, “there is one money, 




Wei (1999) provides new empirical evidence suggesting that exchange rate volatility has had a detrimental effect on trade between pairs of countries to a 
much larger extent than suggested by previous studies.  More generally, in a comprehensive survey of the literature  
 
with regards the exchange rate is bought at the cost of additional uncertainty with 
regards the stance of domestic macroeconomic policy, since balance of payments 
disequilibria now have to be corrected by adjusting the level of aggregate demand 
rather than by altering the exchange rate.  Furthermore, claims that exchange rate 
coordination facilitates price stability need to address the question of the size of the 
gain from reduced inflation as well as the costs of potentially higher unemployment 
and the increased risks of prolonged recession due to the loss of the exchange rate 
instrument in the case of domestic real or external shocks.  There is also the argument 
that almost endemically, exchange rate coordination in and of itself lacks credibility in 
an era of mobile global capital flows, such that the gains from regional exchange rate 
stability will only be derived if the chance of exchange rate adjustment is eliminated 
completely by forming a unified currency area or a full monetary union. 
  In the context of a unified currency area, the potential gains may, once more, 
be subdivided into those that are static, in terms of reduced transactions costs and 
information costs, and those that are dynamic, arising from reduced interest rate 
premia and higher rates of investment and economic growth.  However, no clear 
consensus exists as to the quantitative importance of these potential gains or indeed 
the potential losses from sacrificing exchange rate and monetary policy instruments at 
the level of individual members of the monetary union.  Yet again, therefore, 
monetary unions are frequently seen as essentially political phenomena.
4 
                                                                                                                                            
on the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade flows, McKenzie (1999) concludes that the 
recent empirical studies have had “greater success in deriving a statistically significant 
relationship between volatility and trade” (p.100).  Calvo and Reinhart (2000) review a more 
limited set of such studies and draw a similar conclusion. 
4 Closely related to this, Quan Li (2000) suggests that security externalities and interstate 
alliance ties of currency arrangements influence a country’s choice of exchange rate anchor, 
particularly in the case of developing countries.  Allies, especially defense-pact allies, are  
 
  But this gives rise to another question which tends not to have been addressed 
in the literature.  If both regional trade and regional monetary arrangements may be 
better explained in terms of politics rather than economics, does the same apply to the 
sequence in which regionalism occurs, with trade arrangements normally preceding 
monetary arrangements?  Or is there an economic logic behind a ‘trade first’ strategy? 
 
4.  Interrelationships Between Trade and Monetary Regionalism 
There has been a strong tendency in the literature to treat trade and monetary 
regionalism independently.  Thus, the criteria for judging whether countries would be 
good partners within a customs union have focused on the size of the proposed union 
and the pre-union size of trade between potential partners as indicating the likely 
extent of trade diversion, the degree overlapping in production, as a measure of the 
potential gains from specialization, as well as the cost differentials between 
prospective partners, the size of pre-union tariffs, the price elasticities of demand and 
supply for traded goods and services, and the scope for dynamic gains.  Meanwhile, 
optimum currency area (OCA) criteria have focused on the degree of factor mobility 
between partners, size and openness, trade diversification, dissimilarity of commodity 
composition of production and trade baskets, macroeconomic trends and the 
                                                                                                                                            
more likely to establish a pegged regime.  As the author notes, “(a)lliance affects the anchor 
currency choice by promoting compatible security interests and enhancing commitments to 
the fixed regime through issue linkage.  The pegging country obviously has to watch out for 
the potential manipulation of this relationship by the anchor currency country.  Such abuse is 
likely to be infrequent if two states have compatible interests.  Alliance ties imply common 
security interests between the pegging and the anchor-currency  countries.  With security 
interests more aligned…The pegging country will not only expect less threat from the anchor 
currency country but be more willing to allow the anchor-currency country to tap into those 
resources for political purposes against a third party” (p.7).  As acknowledged by Quan Li 
(2000), there is an older active literature which tries to explain a country’s choice of 
exchange rate regime as an outcome of political dynamics.     
 
synchronization of business cycles, the degree of labour market flexibility, the scope 
for regional transfers and the strength of the financial sectors of potential members.
5  
It is only more recently that the connections between trade and monetary integration 
have been examined, leading some analysts to claim, for example, that conventional 
OCA criteria are endogenous.
6  What are the connections?   
First, if exchange rate stability encourages trade, the formation of an exchange 
rate union will help establish the conditions for a welfare-generating trade agreement.  
By reducing transactions and information costs, a single currency may encourage 
further trade amongst partners in an RTA.  By the same token, however, an RTA may 
be undermined by exchange rate instability amongst members.  Currency 
misalignment or competitive devaluations may generate a protectionist backlash 
which goes against the purpose of the RTA and possibly even threatens its existence, 
as the recent experience of the Mercusor seems to suggest (see Section 6).   Indeed, 
Fernandez-Arias, Panizza and Stein (2002) present evidence based on thirty seven 
countries and six RTAs to suggest that the adverse effects of uncoordinated exchange 
rate policy may be more pronounced within the context of a RTA.  These adverse 
effects can be expected to be greater the deeper the real sector integration, as the 
cross-price elasticity of demand for similar goods and services produced within the 
                                                 
5 Tavlas (1993) provides a succinct summary of the theory of optimum currency areas 
distinguishing between the old theory and the ‘new theory’ which emphasizes the credibility 
of exchange rate commitments.   Other recent reviews of note are Horvath (2001),  Kenen 
(2000) and Willett (2001). 
 
6 Frankel and Rose (1998) suggest that intra-union trade is encouraged by reducing the risk of 
exchange rate changes and that this in turn increases the degree of synchronization between 
business cycles of countries comprising the union which is itself a criterion for an OCA.  We 
return to this idea later. 
  
 
integrated region may rise (so-called ‘knife-edge’ comparative advantage).  This is 
particularly so if, as Fernandez-Arias, Panizza and Stein suggest, intraregional FDI is 
especially footloose and sensitive to exchange rate changes and misalignments. 
Second, the increased openness and intra-union trade encouraged by forming 
an RTA makes flexible exchange rates less appropriate and monetary integration more 
appropriate amongst partner countries.   
Third, while the increased factor mobility that may be associated with forming 
a common market may substitute to some extent for trade amongst partner countries 
(as suggested by conventional trade theory), it may also substitute for exchange rate 
adjustment and therefore help to meet the criteria for an OCA.  
  Fourth, to the extent that a monetary union encourages intra-industry trade 
within the union, it may help not only to enhance the welfare gains from regional trade 
integration but also encourage the closer synchronization of business cycles that then 
helps retrospectively to justify the formation of the monetary union.  This particular 
dimension of the relationship between trade and monetary regionalism has been 
empirically investigated by Frankel and Rose (1998) using thirty years of data for 
twenty industrialized countries.  They acknowledge that if RTAs or monetary unions 
encourage industrial specialization and inter-industry trade according to comparative 
advantage, this could reduce the correlation between business cycles in the member 
countries, and this in turn could weaken the case for monetary integration since 
independent monetary tools, or a flexible exchange rate, may be needed to compensate 
for asymmetrical shocks (Eichengreen, 1992, Krugman, 1993).  However, they claim 
that the empirical evidence that they examine suggests that closer economic 
integration has coincided with closer synchronization between business cycles - hence  
 
the argument that OCA criteria are endogenous.
7  Their finding is also consistent with 
evidence suggesting that European integration has encouraged intra-industry trade 
within the manufacturing sector more than inter-industry trade (Sapir, 2000). 
A number of implications follow from this analysis.  If further EU enlargement 
encourages greater industrial specialization based on factor intensity-driven 
comparative advantage, it does not necessarily follow that the historical trend 
observed by Frankel and Rose will carry forward into the future.  At the same time, 
however, the effects of industry-based asymmetrical shocks could be offset by the 
reduced incidence of demand-side shocks associated with the closer coordination of 
macroeconomic policy; with the implication that the effects of integration on the 
synchronization of business cycles within the integrated area is difficult to predict a 
priori and ex ante.  Fortunately, our principal purpose in this paper is not to pursue 
this particular issue but merely to observe that there will be inter-connections between 
trade and monetary integration, and that the direction of these connections may run 
both ways.  Trade integration and the formation of a common market may help to 
create conditions more suitable for monetary integration.  Meanwhile, monetary 
integration may help to facilitate trade integration.   
 
5.          The Political Economy of Sequencing Regional Trade and Monetary 
Arrangements 
                                                 
7 Rose and Engel (2000) argue that a common currency area significantly increases 
international business cycle correlations.  Frankel and Rose (2001), Glick and Rose (2001) 
and Rose (2000) estimate gravity models using both cross-sectional and time series data and 
conclude that a common currency is especially trade stimulating.  Corsetti and Pesenti (2002) 
formalize the theory behind this catalyzing role of monetary unions and the possibility of 




If the connection between regional trade agreements and regional monetary 
arrangements was simply that RTAs resulted in trade creation with partners and 
helped to establish the OCA criteria, it would be relatively easy to explain why 
historically RTAs tend to come first.  But the previous section identifies a much more 
complex and two-way relationship within which it is as easy to argue that exchange 
rate and even monetary union will help to maximize the benefits from RTAs.  If there 
is this two-way relationship between trade and monetary integration, why is it that we 
observe a strong empirical tendency for trade agreements to come first?  Why are they 
not preceded by exchange rate and monetary union; or why are regional trade and 
monetary arrangements not established simultaneously?   
Conventional economic considerations on their own struggle to explain the 
observed trade-first strategy.  One possibility is that the answer lies in the dynamics of 
integration, but this seems unlikely.  As noted earlier, the dynamic effects of 
integration are difficult to pin down and quantify.  In any case, there is a reasonable 
presumption that the dynamic effects of monetary integration on trade expansion will 
exceed the dynamic effects of trade integration on securing the conditions most suited 
for monetary union.  At the very least, the dynamics do not conveniently explain the 
tendency for a ‘trade first’ strategy towards integration.  In terms of the economics of 
integration, it would be as easy to argue for a ‘money first’ or a concurrent approach.  
So, again, why is this not what we observe? 
RTAs and monetary unions are not just economic phenomena.  Indeed, 
numerous studies emphasize the importance of political imperatives.  Krugman 
(1996), for example, argues that many of the issues surrounding NAFTA at the time  
 
of its inception were of little quantitative significance.  From the viewpoint of the US 
there were never likely to be large gains in terms of increased trade or large costs in 
terms of unemployment amongst unskilled US workers or environmental degradation.  
Subsequent empirical studies appear to confirm this (Krueger, 1999a,b).  Instead, 
NAFTA offered the US a way of assisting Mexico at a time when it was anxious to 
strengthen Mexican democracy, encourage policy reform in Mexico and help Mexican 
economic development.   
Similarly, Goodhart (1995) argues cogently that Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) in Europe reflects a political desire for closer integration.  Strong and 
unambiguous justification is not to be found in the underlying economics.  As Willett 
(2000) observes, “many of the arguments put forward by the political leaders 
advocating EMU were economic, but these were frequently providing cover for 
political objectives and were often based on extremely sloppy, if not outright 
fallacious economic analysis” (p.3).  Emphasizing this point about the importance of 
politics, Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999a,b) have concluded that from an economic 
standpoint East Asia may be as close to, or rather, as far away from being an optimum 
currency area (OCA) as Western Europe.
8  However, the authors go on to conclude 
that Asia is unlikely to move towards a European-type union anytime soon as “there is 
little sign, comparable to the evidence which has existed in Europe for nearly 50 
years, of a willingness to subordinate national prerogatives to some larger regional 
entity.  There is no wider web of interlocking arrangements, as in the EU, which 
                                                 
8 This conclusion is based on an OCA index that takes into account the costs associated with 




would be put at risk by a failure to follow through on promises of monetary and 
financial cooperation” (Eichengreen and Bayoumi, 1999b, p.11).
9 
If politics lies behind both trade and monetary agreements, it may be 
reasonable to assume that politics also helps explain the sequence in which RTAs and 
exchange rate and monetary unions occur.  The short answer may simply be that the 
political rate of return to RTAs is higher than it is for monetary unions, so that it is 
rational for governments to pursue trade regionalism first. 
Let us consider the options facing governments of geographically proximate 
states that are anxious to develop a closer relationship for political (military or 
security) reasons.  A closer relationship can, in principle, extend to a full economic 
union but can be sub-divided into trade integration and monetary integration.   
Economic analysis suggests that there are probably small welfare benefits from trade 
liberalization within the context of an RTA.  But the domestic political costs are 
probably even smaller and may indeed be outweighed by domestic political benefits.  
There are a number of elements to this.   
First, the gainers will be those sectors of the economy that benefit from trade 
expansion and trade diversion.  In the case of the European Union, for example, it has 
been the manufacturing sector that has gained from trade creation and the politically 
powerful agricultural sector that has gained from trade diversion (Sapir, 2000).  An 
analytically strategic component of a customs union is the common external tariff.  It 
                                                 
9 In addition, substantial asymmetries in the sizes and levels and stages of economic 
development of the countries in East Asia, on the one hand, and the de facto policy of strict 
non-intervention in one another’s affairs (economic and particularly political), on the other, 
makes it extremely difficult to envisage the successful introduction of ‘tie-in’ clauses to 
create punishment mechanisms to ensure conformity of economic policies as done in Europe. 
  
 
is this tariff on imports from the rest of the world that generates trade diversion and 
the protectionism involved in RTAs (Krueger, 1997 1999a,b and 2000).  The domestic 
political importance of trade diversion is revealed by the preference governments 
often show for RTAs as opposed to multilateral free trade.  In the latter case, trade 
creation would be greater and trade diversion (except via non-tariff barriers) would be 
eliminated.  In terms of basic economic analysis, the gains from multilateral trade 
integration would generally be higher.  It is therefore the domestic politics of 
protectionism that tends to get in the way.   
Trade policy tends to be more heavily driven by producer interests that may 
benefit from protectionism than by consumer interests where there would be a gain 
from cheaper imports, since producers represent a more coherent and better organized 
political lobby.  Consumers are probably ill-informed about the effects of 
protectionism and are, in any case, poorly organized.  Against this background, RTAs 
offer governments the closer regional relationships that they are anxious to establish at 
relatively little, if any, net domestic political cost.  They may also offer the prospect of 
higher tax revenue than multilateral free trade.  In this context, it is easy to see why 
they have been so widely pursued.
10   
  The matrix of costs and benefits is much different for monetary unions.  Here 
there is less unanimity of view about the benefits.  At least in the case of trade 
integration there is a consensus around the view that there will be some small benefit 
via trade creation.  Not so in the case of monetary unions.  Governments therefore 
                                                 
10 Of course, the suggestion that RTAs are pursued as a protectionist device is less relevant to 
some recent enthusiasts of regionalism like the small city state of Singapore which is already 
highly open to trade and investment flows.  Pursuit of trade agreements by such economies is 
driven by other economic considerations, though security and political do admittedly play a 
significant role (see fn 1 and Rajan et al, 2001 and Rajan and Sen, 2002).  
 
encounter significant uncertainty surrounding the benefits from a full-fledged 
monetary union.  The claim that monetary unions will exert a counter-inflationary 
effect also becomes less compelling in an environment in which inflation is no longer 
perceived as a problem.
11  Moreover, while monetary unions may offer a pro-trade 
benefit they do not offer the protectionist pay-off which is a feature of many RTAs. 
  Lodged against the uncertain benefits from regional monetary arrangements 
is an array of potential political costs.  First, there is the implication that exchange 
rate unions require enhanced labour market flexibility or intraregional labour mobility.  
Establishing this risks domestic political opposition if powerful trades unions have to 
be confronted.  Second, exchange rate unions imply a need for fiscal transfers within 
the union and this may encounter political resistance especially amongst the 
probable creditor nations.  Third, and perhaps most significantly, there is the whole 
notion of ‘national sovereignty’ over domestic macroeconomic policy culminating, in 
the context of Euroland, in the abandonment of national currencies.  This will carry a 
particularly high cost for countries that possess a strong feeling of national identity or 
whose monetary authorities are concerned about forsaking hard-earned credibilility.  
Clearly from a political perspective it is irrelevant whether there is a real loss of 
sovereignty or not.  It is the perception that counts.   
  In addition to the above, the political benefits from incremental regional 
integration may be subject to diminishing returns.  What is the political value-added 
from the greater integration that monetary union brings?  Against this background it is 
easy to see why governments may pursue regional trade integration but may pause 
before they embark on monetary integration.  While, on the basis of economic 
considerations alone, it is unclear why a trade first strategy should be favoured, it 
becomes much easier to understand the preferred approach when political 
                                                 
11 It was possibly the attractions of the counter-inflationary effects of an exchange rate union 
that encouraged the UK to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary 
System in the early 1990s. 
  
 
considerations are added.  The example of West Africa is a special case (Ogunkola, 
2002)  - but it is the exception that proves the rule.  Here it was the common 
importance of France and the French franc that provided the extra impetus needed for 
monetary integration alongside trade integration.  Again it is the politics that is 
central. 
 
6.   Concluding Remarks: Implications for the Future of Regionalism 
 
The analysis in this paper suggests that the path towards regional integration 
and its ‘trade first’ orientation is the outcome of a combination of politics and 
economics.  But, it is the politics that dominates.  There is increasing evidence 
from an economic perspective that trade and monetary integration are closely 
connected.  Most recently in South America, the Mercosur trading agreement 
designed to encourage trade between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay 
has been severely undermined by uncoordinated exchange rate policy between 
Brazil and Argentina.
12  The devaluation of the Brazilian real in 1999 
accentuated the overvaluation of the Argentine peso and contributed to the 
economic crisis in Argentina which in turn had significant negative 
repercussions on the Uruguayan banking system.  Trading partners were in 
effect pursuing competitive exchange rate policy and, as noted earlier, the 
ramifications of exchange rate changes will be much greater for close trading 
partners - fellow members of an RTA - than for other countries.  More 
generally, the situation may be that monetary integration encourages trade and 
that trade integration leads to the closer synchronization of business cycles that 
facilitates monetary integration.  This implies a complex set of positive causal 
interconnections between trade and monetary integration; it does not support 
the universal superiority of a ‘trade first’ strategy. 
What does our analysis suggest for the future of regional integration?  Unless 
there is a very strong commitment to further political integration, as there was 
in Europe, it implies that any global trend towards regionalism is likely to be 
in the form of additional RTAs rather than in the form of deepening existing 
agreements in the direction of monetary union.  Once the broadening of RTAs 
has been completed and the political constraints on deepening them have 
                                                 
12 The member countries of Mercosur did also use economic integration to ‘lock-in’ structural 
reforms which is an important political economy benefit of RTAs involving developing and 
transition countries.   Concerns about the sustainability of Mercosur as only a regional trade 
agreement has given rise to suggestions in some policy circles that it be extended into a full-
fledged regional monetary union (Fratianni, 2002 and Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 1999).  
There is also a growing literature examining the prospects of a monetary union in North 
America (Buiter, 1999).  
 
become binding, the trend towards regionalism may come to an end.  But does 
this mean that the focus will return to multilateral trade policy?  This is 
unlikely if an important part of the appeal of RTAs lies in their protectionist 
dimension (i.e. RTAs are ‘strategic’ rather than ‘natural’).  If governments 
defer exchange rate and monetary integration, uncoordinated exchange rate 
changes may create additional pressures for protectionism which may then 
cause regional trade agreements to unravel to some extent.  For this reason the 
option of stopping the process of integration after regional trade integration 
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Venezuela Vietnam Yugoslavia Zaire Zimbabwe  
 
LAIA  Latin American Integration AssociationArgentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Cuba Ecuador Mexico Paraguay Peru
Uruguay Venezuela 
MERCOSUR  Southern Common Market  Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay 
MSG  Melanesian Spearhead Group  Fiji Papua New Guinea Solomon Islands  Vanuatu 
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement Canada Mexico United States 
OCT  Overseas  Countries  and  Territories  Greenland New Caledonia French Polynesia French Southern and Antarctic
Territories Wallis and Futuna Islands Mayotte Saint Pierre and Miquelon Aruba 
Netherlands Antilles Anguilla Cayman Islands Falkland Islands South Georgia
and South Sandwich Islands Montserrat Pitcairn Saint Helena Ascension Island
Tristan da Cunha Turks and Caicos Islands British Antarctic Territory British 
Indian Ocean Territory British Virgin Islands 
 
PTN  Protocol relating to Trade Negotiations
among Developing Countries 
Bangladesh Brazil Chile Egypt Israel Mexico Pakistan Paraguay Peru Philippines
Republic of Korea Romania Tunisia Turkey Uruguay Yugoslavia 
SAPTA  South Asian Preferential Trade
Arrangement 
Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 
SPARTECA  South Pacific Regional Trade and
Economic Cooperation Agreement 
Australia New Zealand Cook Islands Fiji Kiribati Marshall Islands Micronesia 
Nauru Niue Papua New Guinea Solomon Islands Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu Western
Samoa 
TRIPARTITE  Tripartite Agreement  Egypt India Yugoslavia 
UEMOA 
WAEMU 
West African Economic and Monetary
Union 
Benin Burkina Faso Côte d'Ivoire Guinea Bissau Mali Niger Senegal Togo 
 